Reader submission: War or Peace?

By Meagan Sharp

Is Iran in 2012 another Iraq like 2003?

First of all, the biggest danger for our country right now is that a president is going to overreact and we are going to end up bombing Iran. If we can live through the cold war, which we did, with 30,000 missiles pointed at us then we should sit back and think and not assume that we are going to be attacked! Look what happened with Libya! ISRAEL has 300 nuclear weapons so why are we making them out to be some poor defenseless nation? We have 45 bases in IRAN (not including submarines)! IRAN can’t even produce enough gasoline for themselves and we're worried about them obtaining ONE weapon? Politicians are building this war up just like they did Iraq. We do not need to get involved in another war people!

As if that crisis wasn’t bad enough, President Obama has made it very clear that he will not only ignore the US Constitution, but will refuse to listen to congress when they don't let him have his way. Obama ignores the US Constitution and Congress when it suits his purposes. He issues edicts without regard to the US Constitution and signs into law unconstitutional acts. He is blatantly inconsistent, and he continues to get your support???

Oh, and for those of you who think he’s saving the economy and lowering unemployment: Our national debt has actually increased since Bush was in office, to be specific, the Debt rose $4.899 trillion during the two terms of the Bush presidency and has now gone up $4.939 trillion since President Obama took office. As for unemployment, North Carolina has lost nearly 50,000 jobs since President Obama took office and the unemployment rate is 9.9 percent. In Charlotte, unemployment is even higher, 10 percent. In total, 450,000 North Carolinians are unemployed, up 13 percent since Obama took office and these are just TWO examples.

HOWEVER, just because I am completely against Obama being reelected I want to make it clear that I am just as adamant about Romney NOT being elected either. What Republicans don’t seem to understand is that if Ron Paul is NOT on the ballot, none of his supporters are going to vote for Romney. Ron Paul is the only politician that has a chance of beating Obama. If you vote for Romney and don’t vote for Ron Paul then you can blame yourselves for Obama’s reelection and be prepared for a socialist society.

SO PLEASE, vote for peace, not war; for restraint, not excess; and for civil liberties, not authoritarianism.

RON PAUL 2012.

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President Obama Versus Candidate Obama on the Middle East

In a 2008 campaign speech, then-presidential candidate Obama outlined how his Administration would act with respect to Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Soon after saying, “Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel, and it must remain undivided,”1 he made a variety of promises about Iran’s nuclear program and Middle East peace that have gone similarly unfulfilled under President Obama.

 

Obama claimed “diplomacy” will solve the Iran nuclear problem

 

• A key part of candidate Obama’s 2008 speech was a discussion of how his tough diplomacy would solve the problem of Iran’s illicit nuclear program.

• Senator Obama complained that the policies of President Bush made the United States and Israel "less secure.”

• As proof, he cited the fact that Iran “is now enriching uranium and has reportedly stockpiled 150 kilos of low enriched uranium.”

• If he were president, Obama said, he would “lead tough and principled diplomacy with the appropriate Iranian leader at a time and place of [his] choosing.”

 

But Iran is accelerating its nuclear program

 

• Under President Obama’s policies, Iran has now stockpiled over 3,000 kg of low enriched uranium, more than one-and-a-half times the amount necessary to produce the final material needed in a nuclear bomb.

• It has accelerated its enrichment of uranium over the last three years by every metric, installing more centrifuges, stockpiling more enriched uranium, and enriching uranium to higher levels.

• As Senator Obama said in his 2008 speech, “Those are the facts, they cannot be denied.”

 

Candidate Obama said Russia and China would help on Iran

 

• Senator Obama said in his 2008 speech that he would pursue tough sanctions against Iran and that, under his diplomacy, Russia and China would join in strengthening sanctions against Iran. The contrary has been true.

• As recently as November 2011, President Obama said he expected China and Russia would “continue to cooperate and collaborate closely” on the Iran issue.

But China and Russia have not yet cooperated with the U.S. against Iran

 

• Asserting that China and Russia will “continue” to cooperate on the Iran issue presupposes they have been cooperating to this point, which is belied by the facts.

• Secretary of State Clinton assessed at the beginning of 2011 that there are Chinese entities violating U.S. sanctions law.

• After the November 2011 release of an International Atomic Energy Agency report detailing Iran’s extensive work on nuclear weapons, the New York Times summarized Russia’s position with its headline: “Russia Dismisses Calls for New U.N. Sanctions on Iran.”

Read more.

Israeli Intelligence Agrees with Ron Paul on Potential Nuclear Iran

Reports The Washington Times:

The head of Israel’s intelligence agency says that a nuclear-armed Iran does not necessarily pose an existential threat to the Jewish state, according to Israeli ambassadors.

Mossad chief Tamir Pardo addressed a conclave of Israeli ambassadors in Jerusalem on Thursday, saying that Israel’s existence is not inevitably endangered by Iran acquiring an atomic weapon, even as Israel has tried to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.

“What is the significance of the term ‘existential?’”Mr. Pardo was quoted as saying by several ambassadors. “If you said a nuclear bomb in Iranian hands was…

(Read more)

21st Century Deterrence Challenges

Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control

Omaha, Nebraska

Thank you so much for having me here today. It is always a pleasure to visit STRATCOM and I am honored to be speaking to such a distinguished group of policy and military leaders. Thank you General Kehler, for the invitation: It is a great opportunity for me. I know that many of my colleagues from the interagency have already spoken to you, so I will do my best not to repeat them, but rather supplement and expand on what they discussed.

I was a speaker at this Symposium last summer and I am pleased to report that a lot has changed since last August. Last fall, the State Department underwent some structural reorganization and the Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation became the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance or AVC for short.

AVC leads the Department’s work on arms control, in areas of policy-making, negotiations, treaty implementation, and the Department’s efforts with respect to missile defense, national security space policy, as well as multilateral arms control and disarmament policy.

The new name for my Bureau is more than just a matter of semantics. These changes represent a stronger and more comprehensive approach to arms control and they put us in a better position to carry out the President’s priorities in these areas.

New thinking and innovation is already paying dividends in another area that has changed since the last time I was here.

New START Treaty Implementation

As you all know, the New START Treaty entered into force on February 5th of this year.

The New START Treaty implementation is so far going well. It’s been a bright spot in the U.S.-Russian relationship, and we see it continuing to be an area for positive cooperation.

So far, the process of Treaty implementation has been very pragmatic, business-like, and positive – a continuation of the working relationship we established during the negotiations in Geneva. We are constantly in communication with our Russian colleagues and the implementation process has been precise and efficient.

Negotiators worked hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of this Treaty and the results of that work are already evident. The regime is simpler and safer to implement and, at the same time, it lessens disruptions to the day-to-day operations of both sides’ strategic forces.

On-site inspections have begun and as of today, the United States and Russia together have conducted eight inspections. We are keeping par with each other.

For the first time, we are receiving data about actual re-entry vehicle (warhead) loadings on Russia’s missiles and they receive the same data from us; on-site inspection procedures under New START allow the United States to confirm the actual number of warheads on any randomly selected Russian ICBM and SLBM. This verification task and inspection right did not exist under the START Treaty.

Last March, the United States conducted exhibitions of its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers and the Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of its RS-24 ICBM and associated mobile launcher. That was the first time we had a chance to see the RS-24, the new Russian mobile missile with multiple warheads.

Just two weeks ago, we passed the 1,000th notification between the United States and the Russian Federation under the New START Treaty. These notifications help to track movement and changes in the status of systems, , including, for example, the notification of every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home country for more than 24 hours.

In addition, every six months we exchange a comprehensive database. This gives us a full accounting of exactly where weapons systems are located, whether they are out of their deployment or operational bases and gone to maintenance, or have been retired. This semi-annual exchange, along with the continuous updates and mandatory treaty notifications provide, create a “living document,” a comprehensive look into each other’s strategic nuclear forces.

The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing us with a more detailed picture of Russian strategic forces than we were able to obtain from earlier exchanges and the inspections will give us crucial opportunities to confirm the validity of that data. Of course, reciprocal rights apply to the Russian side. Finally, both of us back up the verification regime with our own National Technical Means of verification, our satellites and other monitoring platforms.

We’ve found that concerns regarding New START verification measures during the Senate ratification debate are being assuaged. Our experience so far is demonstrating that the New START Treaty’s verification regime works, and will help to push the door open to new, more intrusive inspections involving warheads or other smaller items of account. Such inspections will be crucial to any future nuclear reduction plans.

Now let’s look to the next steps.

Next Steps in U.S.-Russian Reductions

You’ve heard from my colleagues about the Defense Department’s assessment effort and the DDPR: We obviously are in the midst of some important homework exercises. I won’t repeat what others have said, but I will add a few thoughts.

While we still have much homework to do, we and the Russians can begin talking about some big concepts, important ideas and the definitions that go with them. We are not ready for the negotiating table, but we are ready for a productive conversation.

The United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. The President communicated this continued commitment in Prague when he signed the New START Treaty in April 2010.

Indeed, the preamble to the New START Treaty called upon both the U.S. and Russia to pursue further reductions. As part of this process, the President supports the Senate’s call in the New START Resolution of Ratification to seek to initiate follow-on negotiations with Russia that include non-strategic nuclear weapons within one year of the Treaty’s entry into force.

In addition to the conceptual conversation I mentioned above, we would also like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia. We are in the process of thinking through how this and other such transparency measures might be implemented. This involves thinking through issues and questions including:

Exactly what kinds of information do we think would be useful and appropriate to share and to seek from each other?

How much detail are we prepared to share regarding numbers, types, and locations of weapons and related infrastructure?

What classes and types of nuclear weapons should be included?

What transparency measures should we consider for the total stockpile, in addition to non-strategic nuclear weapons?

For the United States, what is the best way to consult with Allies on their views to the extent any transparency measures would involve items located on their territories?

What are the legal mechanisms necessary to permit the sharing of sensitive information?

We will consult with our NATO allies and invite Russia to join with us to develop an initiative, including examination of potential reciprocal actions that could be taken in parallel by the United States and Russia.

Our conversation with Russia must include defining what exactly constitutes a non-strategic nuclear weapon and whether or not a single overall limit on all nuclear weapons would be possible. We have a lot of very complicated issues to consider, so the more creative and innovative ideas we have to work with, the better off we will be. For that reason, we are grateful to the community of experts, both government and nongovernment, American, Russian, and international, who are contributing to our work.

Beyond U.S. and Russian Reductions

While the United States and Russia have more steps to pursue bilaterally, it is also time to begin a multilateral dialogue within the P5, as well.

I travelled to Paris last month for a conference where the P5 discussed transparency, verification, and confidence-building measures. The conference was a constructive step in the process of nuclear-weapons states’ engagement on disarmament and related issues, and demonstrated the P5’s commitment to the implementation of the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

All the P5 states recognized the fundamental importance of transparency in building mutual understanding and confidence. We exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and considered possible voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. To this end, we approved the creation of a working group on Nuclear Definitions and Terminology. We will also hold technical consultations on verification issues later this year in London.

In order to ensure that these conferences evolve into a regular process of P5 dialogue, we agreed to hold a third conference in the context of the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee to continue our discussions.

The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts – publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; and working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, and site visits.

We hope that all countries will join in the common effort to increase transparency and build mutual confidence. Confidence-building, at its very core, is a shared effort.

Conclusion

This entire process of next steps in arms control will require some big ideas and some out-of-the-box thinking and we are glad to be engaging the STRATCOM community in this process.

We have seen an evolution in nuclear policy thinking over the past sixty-five years, from policies of massive retaliation to strategies of nuclear war-fighting to our current conversations on strategic stability and predictability.

It is absolutely imperative that we continue to adapt and evolve our thinking to match the circumstances around us. Anticipating and preparing for changes in deterrence will be necessary for the continued security of our nation.

Thanks again for your time and attention. If time permits, I am happy to take a few questions from the audience.

The 25th Anniversary of Chornobyl

Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Ukrainian Embassy

Washington, DC

April 25, 2011

Remarks as prepared:

Thank you for asking me to join you here tonight. I would like to first take this opportunity to pay tribute to the victims of Chornobyl—the many men and women who lost their lives and their livelihoods to the tragic events that transpired 25 years ago today.

In particular, we honor the emergency workers who were the first to respond on that fateful April morning when an explosion in Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chornobyl triggered the most serious nuclear accident the world has ever known.

As clouds of radioactive smoke billowed across large portions of the Western Soviet Union and Europe, these men and women struggled valiantly around the clock to mitigate a humanitarian disaster. Their heroic sacrifice—and the abandoned town of Pripyat—together serve as a powerful reminder that the events of Chornobyl must never be forgotten.

In the 1990s, when I was Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation and National Security, I visited Chornobyl and saw with my own eyes the ruins of Pripyat’, the 30 kilometer Exclusion Zone surrounding Chornobyl, and the reactor site itself. The sight was shocking. But I was glad to see the degree of international cooperation already at work to reverse the environmental impact of the disaster and to ensure that the other three reactors at the site would be safely shut down.

Twenty-five years later, this international cooperation continues. The United States—in concert with our G-8 partners and the international community—remains committed to helping Ukrainians bring the damaged Chornobyl nuclear facility to an environmentally safe and secure condition.

Since the late 1990s, the United States had given some $240 million to Chornobyl nuclear safety projects. Last week at the Chornobyl Pledging Conference, a delegation from the United States led by former National Security Adviser Brzezinski, pledged a further $123 million towards completing the construction of a new safe confinement shelter to cover the aging sarcophagus and a storage facility for spent fuel at the Chornobyl site.

In addition to this assistance, the U.S. has invested millions of dollars in nuclear safety, health, and non-proliferation programs in Ukraine. This partnership has helped Ukraine become a leader, both in nuclear safety, and in non-proliferation, as evinced by Ukraine’s historic decision to give up nuclear weapons back in 1994 and President Yanukovych’s decision just over one year ago to get rid of Ukraine’s stocks of highly enriched uranium.

Ukraine has shown its leadership on nuclear security and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Not only has Ukraine chosen this leadership role on reducing the chances of nuclear terrorism, but Ukraine has chosen a path towards the peaceful use of nuclear technology. As part of the HEU agreement, the United States is building a neutron source facility that Ukraine will use to advance nuclear science, including nuclear medicine, that will bring practical benefits to the Ukrainian people and the whole world.

As we remember this anniversary, we, like people all across the world, are following the grave situation at Japan’s Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant. The events at Fukushima, just like the events at Chornobyl and Three Mile Island, remind us once again that nuclear safety recognizes no boundaries.

We can best pay tribute to the victims of these tragedies by learning from each event and using that knowledge to ensure the safety and security of nuclear energy now and in the future. Meanwhile, we proclaim our solidarity with the people of Japan as we help them rebuild.

It is my hope that the story of Chornobyl strengthens our collective resolve to ensure that nuclear safety remains at the forefront of our efforts as we continue to define the role nuclear power can best play in our energy future.

I am confident that Ukraine will continue to be a leader in these efforts.

Iran Sanctions Act Announcement

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

March 29, 2011

Today, the United States is taking further action to increase pressure on Iran for its failure to meet its international obligations with regard to its nuclear program. A key element of our strategy focuses on Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, which -- as UN Security Council Resolution 1929 recognized -- Iran uses to fund its proliferation activities as well as to mask procurement for the importation of dual-use items. As part of that strategy, the State Department is sanctioning Belarusneft, a state-owned Belarusian energy company, under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996 as amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, for its involvement in the Iranian petroleum sector.

In a thorough review, the Department confirmed that Belarusneft entered into a $500 million contract with the NaftIran Intertrade Company in 2007 for the development of the Jofeir oilfield in Iran. The ISA requires that sanctions be imposed on companies that make certain investments over $20 million.

This action on Belarusneft is another application of U.S. sanctions on Iran. In September, 2010, the State Department announced sanctions on the NaftIran Intertrade Company and the Department has applied the “Special Rule” in CISADA to persuade five major multinational energy companies to pledge to end their investments in Iran and provide assurances not to undertake new energy-related activity in Iran that may be sanctionable. The companies are: Total of France, Statoil of Norway, ENI of Italy, Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands, and INPEX of Japan.

Since President Barack Obama signed CISADA into law on July 1, 2010, Iran’s ability to attract new investment to develop its oil and natural gas resources, and to produce or import refined petroleum products, has been severely limited. The State Department’s direct engagement with companies and governments to enforce CISADA is raising the pressure on the Government of Iran. In the past year, many foreign companies have abandoned their energy-related projects in Iran or have stopped shipping refined petroleum to Iran. This is an appropriate response to Iran’s longstanding use of its oil and gas sector to facilitate its proliferation activities and thereby its noncompliance with its nuclear obligations.

UN Security Council: Remarks on Iran

Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Briefing on Iran and Resolution 1737

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

New York, NY

December 10, 2010

Let me begin by also thanking Ambassador Nishida for his briefing today and for his own and Japan’s exemplary leadership of the 1737 Committee over the past two years. The Committee has accomplished a great deal, and you have set a very high standard for your successor to live up to.

Six months ago, almost to the day, this Council adopted Resolution 1929 in response to Iran’s continued refusal to comply with its international nuclear obligations. Since then, Iran’s noncompliance with its obligations to the Security Council and under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has persisted. So has its lack of full cooperation with the IAEA. And so, as we have just heard, have its numerous violations of Security Council resolutions.

Allow me to make three brief points on the current situation and appropriate next steps.

First, unfortunately, when it comes to Iran’s actions, not much has changed since we last met. Iran continues to violate its obligations to the IAEA and the Security Council.

The IAEA Director-General’s latest report on Iran, released just a few weeks ago, again underscores Iran’s continued refusal to comply with its international nuclear obligations and to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Most notably, the report underscores Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment at 3.5 percent and near-20 percent levels. The report also details Iran’s continued construction of a heavy-water research reactor, its refusal to permit the IAEA the access it needs to answer longstanding questions about the Qom enrichment facility, and its non-response to the questions around a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program. In sum, the IAEA’s latest report records Iran’s continued defiance of its international obligations and shows that Iran has yet to take meaningful steps required by this Council and called for by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Second, we must continue to maintain the pressure on Iran to change course. All member states have an obligation to fully implement Security Council obligations. We urge those that have not yet done so to report to the Committee on their national implementation efforts as soon as possible. These Security Council resolutions affirm obligations on Iran with a clear objective: to resolve the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities.

The 1737 Committee and the recently constituted Panel of Experts will help maintain the pressure on Iran by monitoring and improving the implementation and enforcement of the Iran sanctions regime. In particular, we urge the Committee, with the Panel’s support, to investigate thoroughly all reported sanctions violations. We commend Nigeria for having seized Iranian arms exported in violation of UN sanctions. We also commend Italy for seizing items that Syria was attempting to procure illicitly from Iran. Investigations into these incidents can help us better understand and to halt Iran's arms smuggling and proliferation networks in violation of this Council’s resolutions.

We are pleased that the Panel of Experts is now operational. The Panel is an exceptionally well-qualified team, and we expect that it will significantly improve our ability to monitor and tighten enforcement.

Finally, let me reiterate my government’s commitment to a dual-track strategy of both pressure and engagement to convince Iran’s leadership to change course. Earlier this week, we held frank discussions and dialogue between Iran and our E3+3 partners. We aim to continue the careful, phased process of building confidence between Iran and the international community. As we have said before, we recognize Iran’s rights, but we insist that Iran fulfill the obligations that come along with those rights. Iran’s choice remains clear: if it builds international confidence and respects its obligations, we will reciprocate. But if Iran refuses, its isolation will only grow. We will base our actions on Iran’s degree of cooperation. We look forward to continued talks in late January to discuss practical ideas for a way forward to resolve our core concerns.

We remain committed to working closely with our partners in this Council and the international community to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Thank you.